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Numerous the US multinational enterprises sold considerable amounts of 
products, which were “made” in China or third countries, to China’s 
domestic consumers, but these sales were not counted as the US exports 
to China. We propose a beyond-border-type measure, “trade in factor 
income,” that defines the US-owned factor-income induced by China’s 
final demand as the US export to China. Based on this measure, we find 
that the conventional cross-border trade statistics averagely leads to 
17.4-32.0% overestimation of the US-China trade deficit (2005-2016). 
Our new measure helps a great transformation of trade measures from 
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Abstract (longer version): 
 
One of the most important objectives of exports is to derive income from foreign markets. 
However, conventional cross-border trade statistics may lead to a misunderstanding of the 
nature of international trade, which is characterized by multinational enterprises dominating 
global value chains. For example, numerous the US multinational enterprises sold 
considerable amounts of products, which were “made” or “assembled” in China or third 
countries through FDI channels, to China’s domestic consumers, but these sales were not 
counted as the US exports to China by conventional trade measures. This study proposes a 
novel beyond-border-type trade measure, “trade in factor income (TiFI),” that is based on an 
inter-country-input-output model in consideration of firm ownership heterogeneity and FDI 
channels. In the model, the US-owned factor income induced by China’s final demand is 
defined as the US export to China. Based on TiFI, we find that, on average, from 2005 to 2016, 
the US-China trade deficit was 68.0% of that of the traditional gross trade statistics approach 
and 82.6% of the trade in value-added approach. This new measure enhances our 
understanding of the transformation of trade from the territory-based “made in” label to 
income-based “made for” or “created by” label in the era of global value chains. 
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In 2018, the US had a 420 billion US$ trade deficit with China, which was 
approximately half of its total trade deficit in that year. The huge and persistent trade deficit 
triggered the ongoing trade war between them—the two largest economies in the world. The 
apparent trade deficit might be a justifiable reason for the US to wage the trade war to increase 
access of its goods to China. However, a critical question is whether current trade statistics, 
which are compiled based on the classic “cloth-for-wine” trade, present the true picture of the 
trade balance between the two countries. Most of China’s exports are manufactured and traded 
along global value chains (GVCs) and contain a large content of foreign value-added, which 
has significantly inflated China’s exports to and trade surplus with the US.  
We use Xing and Detert’s (2010) case study of iPhone 3G exports from China to the 
US as an example. iPhone contributed 1.9 billion US$ to the US-China gross trade deficit in 
2009. However, from a value-added perspective, China contributed only 3.6% to this deficit. 
Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014) showed that the US-China trade 
balance would be smaller when trade in value-added (TiVA), which is a newly developed 
method that is based on inter-country-input-output (ICIO) models, is used to measure it. The 
WTO report (WTO, 2017) also showed that when the TiVA approach is used, the China-US 
trade imbalance is 79% of what is calculated with gross trade volumes in 2008 and less than 
one-fifth for the ICT sector. 
Although studies have improved our understanding of trade in an age of GVCs, they 
have not touched on issues about the gains of multinational enterprises that organize and 
manage the operations of GVCs. According to conventional trade statistics, China has a 
massive trade surplus with the US, but based on recent firm-level analyses (Zhang et al., 2018; 
IMF, 2021), the US firms, including its affiliates worldwide, sold more goods and services to 
China than what China’s firms sold to the US in 2017.  
Selling made in the US goods in China is one way that the US exports to China. The 
unprecedented liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) offers another means of selling 
the US goods to Chinese consumers. To date, the massive number of the US brand goods 
produced by the US invested firms in China is sold in the Chinese market (e.g. Tesla’s China-
made Model 3 vehicles). However, according to the rules of national accounting, those sales are 
treated as China’s domestic transaction (none is regarded as the US exports to China in 
conventional international trade statistics), and profits associated with those sales are also 
counted as part of China’s GDP. Part of those sales represent returns on both tangible and 
intangible assets of the US affiliates. If their products are shipped to the Japanese market, 
they will be treated as China’s exports to Japan in conventional trade statistics (none will be 
regarded as the US export to Japan). Current trade statistics are defined by the territory 
(relating to the border of the country) rather than the ownership of factor income, which causes 
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the problem of “what you see (domestic sales or trade flows) is not what you get (income)” in 
examining economic transactions.  
One of the important objectives of exports is to derive income from foreign markets. 
Exporting products directly to foreign countries, building factories abroad, or outsourcing 
production to foreign contact manufacturers are different business models but have the same 
objective of making profits. In terms of income generation, they are not different. FDI combined 
with intellectual properties is a popular means of earning returns on intangible assets in the 
global market. For example, an estimated 85% of the S&P 500’s (the 500 largest firms on U.S. 
stock markets, most of which are involved internationally) market capitalization comes from 
intangible assets (Reuters, 2020). Inspired by these facts, this study proposes a new concept of 
exports, “trade in factor income (TiFI).” TiFI is based on the ownership of factor income. 
Moreover, this study develops a new accounting system of international trade to trace factor 
incomes, which mainly comprise labor compensation and return to capital, embodied in trade 
at country, sector, and bilateral levels by firm ownership to have a better understanding of the 
actual magnitude of the US-China trade balance and the income distribution pattern in GVCs. 
TiFI is based on a new ICIO model that includes firm ownership information and FDI 
channels. TiFI employs both the “tear down” type case studies, with explicit consideration of 
multinationals’ investment and trade activities worldwide, and the logic of ICIO based TiVA 
measure to remove double counting. More importantly, we extend the concept of commercial 
presence (Mode 3) used in measuring services trade (WTO, 1994)1 to factor incomes embodied 
in both goods and services.  
Our measure mainly assigns factor income of multinationals that produce factory 
goods2 outside their home countries through FDI channels (we refer to this phenomenon as 
“hidden trade”) rather than multinationals that are “factoryless” goods producers (FGPs)3, 
such as iPhone’s producer, Apple. This is because most of Apple’s profit embodied in China-
assembled products are not recorded as part of China’s GDP (de Haan and Haynes, 2018; 
Brothers, 2014). The emergence of FGPs has also caused the so-called “missing export” 
                                                        
1 Services supplied by a WTO member through commercial presence in the territory of any other member, e.g., 
the service is provided in country A by a locally established affiliate, subsidiary, or representative office of a 
foreign-owned and foreign-controlled company (e.g., bank, hotel group, and construction company). 
2 “Factory-goods” refer to products made by non-factoryless goods producers, which refer to multinationals 
that fully or partly own a factory abroad they use to produce goods and services through FDI channels. 
3 According to the definition by Eurostat, a FGP is an extreme case of goods sent abroad for processing, where 
the physical transformation of the goods is 100% outsourced. A FGP arrangement occurs when a resident firm 
owns the intellectual property, such as the technology, know-how, and product design, used in the production 
process but fully outsource the material transformation process (either in the same country or abroad) required 
for production. The thrust of this arrangement is that the control over the outcome of the production process 
and ownership and provision of the intellectual property product (IPP) inputs coincide with the economic 




problem discussed by Xing (2020), who argued that “if the value-added of Apple intellectual 
property and services embodied in all Apple products sold to the foreign consumers were 
counted as part of US exports, the US-China trade deficit in 2015 would decrease by 5.2%.” 
Therefore, by combining our TiFI-based measure for multinationals that produce factory goods 
via FDI with Xing’s (2020) measure for multinationals that are FGPs, we get a clearer 
understanding of the real size of the US-China trade balance. 
Our main conclusion, which is based on real data, shows that when treating the US-
owned factor incomes induced (absorbed) by China’s final demand in both domestic transaction 
and international trade as the US exports to China (we define this as bilateral TiFI) and China-
owned factor incomes induced by the US final demand as China’s exports to the US, the US-
China trade deficit in factor income terms from 2005 to 2006 is on average 68.0% of that of the 
traditional gross trade statistics approach and 82.6% of the conventional TiVA approach. This 
huge difference in measuring the US-China trade balance indicates that the existing trade 
measures do not correctly capture the essential features of the 21st-century type trade 
(Baldwin et al., 2014), which is characterized as multinationals-dominated GVCs, thereby 
making it difficult to truly understand “who gains what from where” through complex 
international trade and investment in the globalized world economy. 
 
I. The Concept of Trade in Factor Income  
 
Using the US-China trade as an example, TiFI is defined as follows: 
 
The US exports to China in factor income terms is the US-owned factor incomes induced by 
China’s final demand; the US-owned factor incomes include the return to tangible and 
intangible assets of the American-owned firms located in the US and outside the US via FDI 
channels, the US domestic labor compensation, and the net taxes of the US government.   
 
China’s exports to the US in factor income terms is China-owned factor incomes induced by 
the US final demand; China-owned factor incomes include the return to tangible and 
intangible assets of the Chinese-owned firms located in China and outside China via FDI 
channels, China’s domestic labor compensation, and the net taxes of the Chinese government. 
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Table 1． The concept of trade in factor income and its relation with gross term trade and trade in value-added measures 
 
 
Note: * refers to the foreign value-added and double counting embodied in the US gross exports to China; Net taxes refers to taxes minus 
subsidies on products. 
 
The US exports to China measured in different terms:  
Gross Exports = 1 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 7 + 8 +* 
TiVA  = 1 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 7 + 8 





Using two types of firms, the US- and foreign-owned firms, in three locations, 
the US, China, and third countries as an example, we use Table 1 to explain how we 
define the US exports to China in TiFI terms and its relationship with TiVA and the 
gross trade statistics. In an input-output (IO) system, value-added in factor income 
comprises labor compensation, returns to capital (including both tangible and intangible 
assets), and net taxes (taxes minus subsidies on products). In gross terms, the US exports 
(1 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 7 + 8 +*) include the domestic value-added of the US- (1 + 2 + 3) and 
foreign-owned firms (6 + 7 + 8) in the US and foreign value-added and double-counted 
parts of intermediates embodied in those exports (*). In value-added terms, the US 
exports (1 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 7 + 8) are the pure domestic value-added (1 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 7 + 8) 
without any foreign value-added and double counting involved. In factor income terms, 
the US exports (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) include domestic value-added of the US-owned 
firms (1 + 2 + 3), returns to capital of the US-owned firms in China (4) and third countries 
(5), labor compensation of foreign-owned firms in the US (6), and net taxes on products 
of foreign-owned firms in the US (7). 
The treatment of factor incomes, especially the return to capital associated with 
trade, is different from the concept of national income in the national accounting system. 
For example, in definition, the return to capital of the US-owned firms in China is part 
of China’s GDP; most of this capital gain may be added to China’s gross national income, 
but they are widely owned and controlled by the US-owned firms. Some of this return to 
capital may be reinvested in China or repatriated to the US to pay the cost of using 
intangible capital (e.g., R&D, superior brand value, sophisticated distribution strategies, 
and organizational capital (Setser, 2017)) or to pay dividends to stockholders. However, 
they are extremely difficult to be traced at country, sector, and bilateral levels by firm 
ownership using the concept of pure national income due to the complex structure of 
stockholder and the problem caused by transfer pricing (Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017).  
Compared with those of the traditional gross trade statistics, the conventional 
TiVA, firm-level survey data on multinationals, and individual firm’s case studies in 
measuring bilateral trade balance (Table 2), the originality and innovation of TiFI are 
obvious. The limitation of the traditional gross statistics approach is double counting, 
with no explicit consideration of factor income. The conventional TiVA approach solves 
the double counting problem at country sector levels, but it highly relies on the GDP 
concept, without explicit consideration of factor income by firm ownership. The firm-level 
survey data on multinationals’ sales can be used to partly trace factor income but has 
the double counting problem. The “tear down” type firm- and product-based case studies 
provide a very intuitive but partial solution for double counting and FGP-related 
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“missing exports” problems since they cannot trace value-added and factor income in the 
upstream and downstream of an entire value chain. TiFI covers both cross-border and 
cross-firm boundary transactions, without any double counting, thus can bridge value-
added to factor income by firm ownership (excluding FGPs) and, like traditional trade 
statistics and TiVA, it can offer a universal accounting framework. 
 






















































































































































statistics in gross terms 
(e.g., UN Comtrade) 
✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
Firm-level transaction 
data (e.g., BEA’s data on 
multinationals) 
✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
The conventional 
territory-based TiVA 
(e.g., ICIO models) 
✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
Firm- and product-level 
case studies 
(e.g., iPhone case studies) 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
TiFI (our method) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
 
 
II. Model and Data 
  
Our method is based on the work of Leontief (1936). Leontief demonstrated that the 
complex relationships between different industries in various countries can be expressed 
as various inter-industry and cross-country transactions organized into chessboard-type 
matrices, which is known as IO tables. Each column in the table represents the inputs 
required from other industries (including imports and direct value-added) to produce a 
given amount of a product. After normalization, the technical coefficient table represents 
the amount and type of intermediate inputs needed to produce a unit of gross output. 
Using these coefficients, the gross output in all stages of production that is needed to 
produce a unit of final products can be estimated using the Leontief inverse. When the 
output associated with a particular level of final demand is known, the total value-added 
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throughout the (global) economy can be estimated by multiplying these output flows with 
the value-added ratio (the amount of value-added per unit of gross output) in each 
country/industry.  
Following Leontief ’s ideas, TiVA, which is a measure of bilateral trade, was 
recently developed by Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014). Their 
novel contribution is to avoid the double counting in using traditional gross trade 
statistics to measure bilateral trade, thus making the consistent tracing of value-added 
creation, transfer, and distribution across countries available in an inter-country input-
output (ICIO) framework. 
 
Table 3. The layout of the OECD AMNE ICIO tables 
 
Note: The ICIO data used is from the OECD analytical AMNE database (Cadestin et al., 2018), where 
firms are split according to their ownership (D: domestic-owned firms and F: foreign-owned firms) from 
2005 to 2016, with G=60 economies (including the “rest of the world” as one economy) and N=34 sectors 
in the ISIC Rev. 4 classification at the basic price.4 Foreign-owned firms are defined as foreign affiliates 
that have at least 50% foreign ownership, and domestic-owned firms include domestic multinationals 
(domestic firms with foreign affiliates) and domestic firms that are not involved in international 
investment. 𝒁𝐹𝐷
12  is the N by N matrix, representing the exports of intermediate inputs produced by 
foreign-owned firms in country 1 used by country 2’s domestic-owned firms. 𝒀𝐹
12 is the N by 1 vector 
representing the exports of final products produced by foreign-owned firms in country 1 used by country 
2. X is the 2GN by 1 column vector of output; Va is the 1 by 2GN row vector of value-added. For detailed 
information about the country or regional sector classification, on can refer to Appendices 1 and 2.  
                                                        
4 The main data sources used in compiling the OECD AMNE–ICIO tables include the OECD–ICIO 
tables, OECD–AMNE statistics, national accounts, other national sources, Trade by Enterprise 
Characteristics, Services Trade by Enterprise Characteristics, and micro-level databases. 
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To estimate the bilateral TiFI, we follow the logic of TiVA and develop a new 
ICIO model that considers firm ownership heterogeneity and FDI channels. In the first 
stage of our estimation of TiFI, we consider an ICIO model with G countries, N sectors, 
and 2 types of firms (D: domestic-owned firms; F: foreign-owned firms), which is 
consistent with the layout of the available OECD AMNE ICIO tables (see Table 3 and its 
note). In the second stage, we estimate the bilateral sectoral FDI stock data to measure 
the contribution of factor income by country of origin of the foreign-owned firms under 
some technology assumptions (see Appendix 1). 
Based on our definition of TiFI, country r’s factor income induced by country s’ 











rs is country r’s domestic-owned firms’ value-added induced by country s’ 










rs , and 𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈_𝐓𝐃
rs  are country r’s induced domestic-owned firms’ labor 
compensation (L), return to capital (C), and net taxes (N) by country s’ final demand, 

































r  are 1 by N row vectors indicating the share 
of country r’s domestic-owned firms’ labor compensation (𝐋𝐃
r ), return to capital (𝐂𝐃
r ), and 
net taxes (𝐍𝐃
r ) in their output (𝐗𝐃
r ) by sector, respectively. /: is an elementwise vector 
division operator. 𝐁𝐃𝐃
rt  is the N by N sub-matrix of the 2GN by 2GN global Leontief 
inverse 𝐁 = (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏, indicating the induced output of country r’s domestic-owned firms 
by a unit final demand of products made by country t’s domestic-owned firms; 𝐁𝐅𝐃
rt  is the 
sub-matrix of the global Leontief inverse B, indicating the induced output of country r’s 
foreign-owned firms by a unit final demand of products made by country t’s domestic-
owned firms; 𝐘𝐃
ts is N by 1 column vector indicating country s’ final demand of products 
10 
 
made by country t’s domestic-owned firms; 𝐘𝐅
ts  is N by 1 column vector indicating 
country s’ final demand of products made by country t’s foreign-owned firms. 
𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈_𝐋𝐅
rs  in Eqution (1) is country r-located foreign-owned firms’ labor 
compensation induced by country s’ final demand; 𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈_𝐓𝐅
rs is country r-located foreign-
owned firms’ net tax induced by country s’ final demand; 𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈_𝐂𝐅=𝐫
ss  is country s-located 
country r-owned firms’ return to capital induced by country s’ final demand; 𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈_𝐂𝐅=𝐫
ts(t≠r,s)
 
is third country t (t ≠ r, s)-located country r-owned firms’ return to capital induced by 






























us)𝐮 .    (9) 
 





s,       (10) 
 
where 𝛅𝐫
s is the share of country s-located country r-owned firms’ FDI stock in the total 
inward FDI stock of country s by sector; 𝐜𝐅
s = 𝐂𝐅
s/𝐗𝐅
s  is the 1 by N vector, indicating the 
share of country s-based foreign-owned firms’ return to capital (𝐂𝐅
s) in its output (𝐗𝐅
s) by 
sector. Since there is no available, relevant, and comparable international data to show 
the return to capital of a specific country-owned firms (FDI home country) that invest in 
another country (FDI host country) at the sector level, Equation (10) assumes that more 




t .  
 In addition, there is no available, relevant, and comparable international data 
to show the production function of FDI firms by country of origin at the sector level. From 
the OECD AMNE ICIO data, we can only derive the average production function (the 
input structure of intermediates) of foreign-owned firms at the sector level as a whole. 
Since different country may bring or use different technologies to invest abroad, we use 
the following pools (combinations) of technology assumptions as the boundary of our 
estimation of bilateral TiFI.  
Technology Assumption 1 (TA1: baseline): the FDI home country (investor) uses 
an average technology as other FDI home countries use in the FDI host country 
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(investee); TA1 can be regarded as a type of technological convergence due to the market 
competition of FDI home countries. 
Technology Assumption 2 (TA2): the FDI home country (investor) brings its 
domestic technology to the host country (investee). 
Technology Assumption 3 (TA3): the FDI home country (investor) uses the same 
technology as the host country (investee) uses. TA3 can be regarded as a type of 
technological convergence between FDI home and host countries due to market 
competition or spillover of technology.  
 We believe that, in practice, technologies used (brought in) by firms of an FDI 
home country in the host country depend on many factors (e.g., competition, market 
strategy, and IP protection) and should be a combination of the above assumptions. 
Therefore, the estimation boundary of bilateral TiFI can be given as follows: 
𝐮𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝: 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐦𝐚𝐱
{𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝑨𝟏,𝑻𝑨𝟐,𝑻𝑨𝟑}
(𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈rs),   (11) 
𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫 𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝: 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐦𝐢𝐧
{𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝑨𝟏,𝑻𝑨𝟐,𝑻𝑨𝟑}
(𝐓𝐢𝐅𝐈rs).   (12) 
 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
A. A New Map of the US-China Trade Balance 
 
Based on the newly defined concepts of exports, we re-estimate the trade balance 
between the US and China. Figure 1 depicts the bilateral trade between the US and 
China from 2005 to 2016 using three different measures—gross trade flows, TiVA, and 
TiFI—based on the OECD AMNE database, including ICIO tables that were split based 
on firm ownership (see Table 3) and our estimation of sectoral and bilateral FDI data 
(see Appendix 1). From 2005 to 2016, on average, the US exports to China in TiFI terms 
are 20.34% (ranging from 10.73% in 2016 to 49.43% in 2005) and 8.21% (ranging from 
0.57% in 2015 to 31.84% in 2005) higher than those in TiVA and traditional gross terms. 
On average, China’s exports to the US in TiFI terms are 1.64% (ranging from 5.13% in 
2005 to 0.70% in 2016) and 16.04% (ranging from 24.21% in 2005 to 9.62% in 2016) 





Figure 1. Bilateral trade between the US and China by different measures (Million US$) 
 
 
Figure 2. The China-US trade surplus by different measures (Million US$) 
 
We also calculate the China-US trade balance using TiFI and compare it with 
the other two measures. Figure 2 shows that, on average, China’s trade surplus with the 
US measured by TiFI is about 68.0% of that measured by gross trade volumes from 2005 
to 2016. Compared with the trade surplus computed with TiVA, which is supposed to 
remove the distortion associated with foreign value-added, on average, the bilateral 





Note: TSGT: trade statistics in gross terms, TiVA: trade in value-added, TiFI: trade in factor income 
 
Figure 3. The sources of the TiFI-based China-US trade surplus (Million US$) 
 
The above phenomenon is depicted in detail in Figure 3, which shows the 
sources of the TiFI-based China-US trade surplus. China-based China-owned firms’ 
value-added (return to capital, labor compensation, and net taxes on products) export to 
the US and the US-based the US-owned firms’ value-added export to China are the main 
components of the China-US trade balance. These two parts also play the same role in 
determining the conventional TiVA-based China-US trade balance. Therefore, the main 
difference between TiFI and the conventional TiVA in measuring bilateral trade balance 
is in how the return to capital of each countries’ multinationals overseas are treated. 
Based on our definition of TiFI, the return to capital of China-based the US-owned firms 
absorbed by China’s final demands is treated as the US export to China, which is 
considered as domestic transactions in the conventional TiVA measure. The return to 
capital of third-country-based the US-owned firms absorbed by China’s final demands is 
also treated as the US export to China in TiFI, which is allocated as third countries’ 
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value-added export to China in the conventional TiVA measure. Therefore, the 
considerable difference in the US-China trade balance using TiFI- and TiVA-based 
measures (Figure 2) is mainly due to the huge presence of the US-owned multinationals 
in the GVCs that earn more factor income from their tangible and intangible assets in 
overseas markets than China-owned firms (Figure 3). In addition, as shown in Figure 2, 
in 2016, the TiFI-based China-US trade surplus is close to the conventional TiVA-based 
approach, which could be explained using the information in Figure 3. The increasing 
return to capital of China-owned multinationals in overseas markets was induced by the 
US final demand and the decreasing return to capital of the US-owned multinationals 
in overseas markets was induced by China’s final demand. 
 
 
B. An Application of TiFI to Measuring Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
 
Note: TSGT: trade statistics in gross terms, TiVA: Trade in Value-Added, TiFI: Trade in Factor 
Income; for detailed country and sector code, see Appendices 2 and 3. 
C. Figure 4. RCA based on different measures of trade 
15 
 
 As an application of TiFI, we re-evaluate the revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) based on Hoen and Oosterhaven’s (2006) measure and compare it with the 
conventional measures in both gross and value-added terms for manufacturing sectors 
(using the auto industry—motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, other transportation 
equipment—as an example) and services sectors (using financial and insurance activities 
as an example) in 2016 (see Figure 4). Japan, Germany, and Korea, with many big names 
of famous car brands, which invest all over the world to produce cars locally, ranked at 
the top of the RCA based on TiFI. This implies that without considering the ownership 
and controlling power of multinationals in measuring trade, countries such as Japan, 
Germany, and Korea’s real comparative advantages of their tangible and intangible 
capital will be underestimated. Similarly, the US, Ireland, and Belgium have top RCA 






Due to the rapid development of GVCs over the last three decades, the “made in” label, 
which is typical of manufactured goods (ranging from trunk planes to small electronic 
devices) that attribute them to a specific economy, has become an archaic symbol since 
most manufactured goods are now “made in the world” (WTO-IDE, 2011). According to a 
recent report (UNCTAD, 2013), “80% of trade takes place in ‘value chains’ linked to 
transnational corporations.” Furthermore, as Cadestin et al. (2019) stated, 
“multinationals account roughly for one-half of international trade, one-third of output 
and GDP and one-fourth of employment in the global economy.” 
However, the exiting trade statistics highly rely on the territory-based measures 
(the border of the country) rather than the ownership or controlling power of firms, which 
may lead to a misunderstanding of a bilateral trade relationship. This study proposes a 
new measure, TiFI, which assigns the return to multinationals’ capital to the source 
country of the capital owner, and we use a new model with new data, which significantly 
leads to a better understanding of the real size of the bilateral trade balance between 
countries in terms of factor income. This TiFI measure can also be considered as a type 
of beyond-border trade measure, which significantly improves our understanding of the 
nature of the complex GVCs, such as about “who produces what for whom” and “who gets 
factor income from where.” Once returns to capital is divided into tangible and intangible 
parts as Alsamawi et al. (2020) did, more policy-oriented research can be done. 
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This TiFI measure will not only be applied in re-evaluating economic 
phenomenon, such as trade balance and revealed comparative advantages, but also can 
be used in environmental analyses, such as embodied carbon emissions, pollution, waste 
in international trade, and international carbon leakage, which may enrich our 
understanding of the so-called “pollution haven” and “race to the bottom” hypotheses as 
well as a better approach to sharing the responsibility of climate change in the GVCs. 
Although the ultimate destination of the return to capital beyond TiFI still 
needs further investigation5, this measure no doubt provides the second-best and feasible 
solution for a better understanding of the nature of GVCs while focusing on the owner of 
capital that essentially controls the firm, thereby greatly enhancing our understanding 
of trade from “made in” labels to “made for” or “created by” labels. 
  
                                                        
5 For example, Fu and Ghaur (2019)’ novel work to integrate trade in intangibles with detailed five 
modes to trade in goods and services in the context of GVCs. They found that major countries such as 
United States, UK, Switzerland, Japan, France, Germany and Sweden see large upward adjustments 
in trade imbalance. However, their work was done at the national level rather than bilateral level, 
without explicit consideration of inter-country production networks.  
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Appendix 1. The estimation of bilateral FDI flows (stocks at the sector level)  
 
This section presents the estimation of the bilateral sectoral FDI stocks network from 
2004 to 2018. High-resolution global FDI by regions and economic activities can be used 
to reflect global economic interconnectedness in detail. In this section, we outline the 
process used to construct the bilateral FDI stocks database, which involves three main 
steps. 
Step 1. Coordinating data from different databases and mapping regions and sectors by 
the correspondence of ISIC.Rev.4 and ISO3. 
This study employs four main databases. (1) GTAP bilateral multi-region multi-
sector FDI stocks database in 2004, covering 57 sectors and 113 economics; (2) 
UNCTAD’s bilateral FDI stocks for 206 economics (2005–2012) and the total outward 
FDI (OFDI) of each country to the world as the total constraint (2005-2018); (3) the 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) released by IMF, which presents detailed 
data on direct investment positions from 249 to 123 economies cross-border data from 
2009; (4) FDI stocks of OECD countries by industrial sector from OECD International 
Direct Investment Statistics from 2005 to 2018; (5) China’s regional and sectoral OFDI 
stocks refer to the Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI. To ensure the completeness and 
availability of data, we combine these different databases by sectors and regions. The 
industry-level bilateral FDI database we constructed includes 35 regions (including the 
rest of the world) and 20 sectors from 2004 to 2018, and the total number of reporting 
regions equals the number of partner regions. 
Step 2. Adjusting the target row and column constraints and uniforming the sum 
constraint. Assuming that economic activities can be categorized into m  sectors and n  
regions;  = 20m ;  = 35n ; i  and j  refer to reporting regions and partner regions, 
respectively; [1, ]i n ; [1, ]j n ; i ,t
j ,sM  represents the initial bilateral FDI stock matrix 
for reporting region i  in year t ; i ,t
s , jx  is the value of FDI stocks from region i  to 
region j  for sector s  in year t ; [0,14]t ; and [1, ]s m , Equation (1) indicates the 
structure of initial matric of the sectoral and regional FDI stocks. 
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sM in Equations (2) and (3) refer to the column total as the regional 
constraint and the row total as the sectoral constraint of the initial matrix, respectively. 
To ensure the convergence of the following estimated iterative procedure, it is vital to 
keep the sum of the column total equal to the sum of the row total. Uniformity and 
incommensurability cannot be ensured if the sums of different years are based on 
different statistical methods and sources. Equation (4) does not always work. Although 
the initial matrix and constraint are based on the same database (GTAP bilateral FDI 
stocks for the basic year), the initial data for other years are from other different 





i,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
j s
j s 
  M M M T       (4) 
For the basic year (  = 0t ), i ,t
j ,sM =
0i ,




i, i , i ,
j s
j s 
  M M M , 
0 0i , i ,M T , so we replace 
0i ,
M  with 
0i ,
T  and then 
redistribute the sectoral and regional distribution for each reporting region using 
Equations (5) to (8). 
0 0 0i , i , i ,
j j /R = M M     (5) 
0 0 0i , i , i ,
s s /R = M M     (6) 
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0 0 0*i , i , i ,










u  are the new target column and row constraints, respectively.  
From 2005 to 2018 (  = 1,2 14t ， ， ), the row and column constraints are calculated 
using the sectoral structure based on the OECD database; the regional structure is based 
on UNCTAD (2005-2008) and CDIS (2009-2018). Both are combined with the reporting 
regions ( i ), which is recorded as the total OFDI i ,tT , to obtain the new column *i ,tv  
and the column row constraints 
* i ,t
u  by industry and reporting region based on the 
corresponding databases; they are given as follows: 
*i ,t *i ,t i ,t
j v R T                          (9) 
    
*i ,t *i ,t i ,t
s u R T .       (10) 
Step 3. RAS by regions and years based on the initial matrix and target column and row 




M  in year  -1t for each region except for the basic year. If  = 0t , 
0i ,
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v ;  
i ,t
i ,t * i ,t
l /s u u and  
i ,t
i ,t * i ,t
k /r v v are the row and column multipliers, 
respectively. This study applies the RAS approach, which is achieved by multiplying 
i ,t




kr̂  until both the row and column totals converge 
to the target vectors. Then, the final estimated matrix will be ready to undergo a 
sequence of iterative multiplications as follows: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 1 1 2 1
i , i , i , i , i , i , i , i , i , i ,
s , j l l s , j k k
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
 M s s s s M r r r r ( =0t )   (14) 
-1
1 2 1 1 2 1
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
s , j l l s , j k k
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
 M s s s s M r r r r  ( 1t  ),   (15) 
where 
1 2 1 = 
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
l l
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
s s s s S and 1 2 1 = 
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
k k
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
r r r r R . The rows and columns are adjusted 
l and k  times to obtain the final FDI stocks matrix. The adjustment process from 2005 
to 2018 can be modified as follows: 
1i ,t i ,t
s , j s , j
ˆ ˆM SM R      (16) 
The estimated FDI stocks matrix by reporting regions can be integrated into one table, 
where, as shown in Figure A1, the columns and rows represent the reporting and partner 




Note:  𝑆𝑚  represents sectors m ; nR  and nP  refer to the reporting regions 𝑛 and partner 
regions 𝑛, respectively. 
Figure A1. The structure of bilateral sectoral FDI 
 
Appendix 2. More applications of TiFI 
 
TiFI not only works for the US-China trade relation but can also be 
systematically and consistently applied to every bilateral relation in GVCs. Figure A2 
depicts how bilateral trade relations are different across these three measures. Although 
the conventional TiVA-based bilateral trade balance corrects the traditional gross trade 
statistics-based approach by solving the double counting problem, they are highly 
correlated, so the overall view on the global unbalance does not change significantly. This 
is mainly because both ignore the “hidden trade” problem, which was mentioned in the 
previous section. By contrast, a relatively lower correlation could be found between TiFI 
and either the traditional gross trade statistics or the conventional TiVA in measuring 
bilateral trade balance.  
 
 
Figure A2. Correlations among three measures of bilateral trade balance (2005-2016) 
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To show how the TiFI-based measure differs from others, and how it can 
significantly improve our understanding of bilateral trade balances, we pick some 
country pairs that have a relatively large amount of bilateral trade balance and illustrate 
their relationships in 2016 in Figure A3. The circle size of each country or region in the 
figure shows the absolute magnitude of trade volume (the sum of the absolute value of 
export and import according to different terms, such as gross term, value-added term, 
and factor income term). The thickness and arrow show the magnitude and direction of 
net exports in different measures, respectively.  
There is no significant structural difference but just a little difference in the 
magnitude of bilateral trade balance between the traditional gross trade statistics-based 
measure and the conventional TiVA-based measure. Ranking by magnitude, the US had 
a huge trade deficit with China, EU21, Mexico, Canada, and Japan but had a trade 
surplus with Australia. China had a huge trade surplus with the US, EU21, and Mexico 
but had a trade deficit with Chinese Taipei, Korea, Australia, and Hong Kong. However, 
the TiFI-based net trade flow for some countries shows different magnitudes from the 
conventional TiVA-based measure. For example, the China-US and EU21-US trade 
surplus declined, whereas the Japan-US and Korea-US trade surplus increased. The US-
Australia trade surplus appeared more outstandingly; the Mexico-US, Australia-China, 
Turkey-Canada, and Australia-Japan trade surplus declined greatly (using the same 
threshold as that of convention TiVA); the EU21-Mexico and Hong Kong-China trade 
surplus is outstandingly obvious. All these differences between the conventional TiVA 
and TiFI approaches reflect the importance of considering the ownership of factor income 











Appendix 3. Country/region code in the OECD, Analytical AMNE Database 
    
OECD code OECD countries Non-OECD code Non-OECD economies 
AUS 1 Australia ARG 37 Argentina 
AUT 2 Austria BRA 38 Brazil 
BEL 3 Belgium BGR 39 Bulgaria 
CAN 4 Canada CHN 40 China (People's Republic of) 
CHL 5 Chile COL 41 Colombia 
CZE 6 Czech Republic CRI 42 Costa Rica 
DNK 7 Denmark HRV 43 Croatia 
EST 8 Estonia CYP 44 Cyprus6 
FIN 9 Finland IND 45 India 
FRA 10 France IDN 46 Indonesia 
DEU 11 Germany HKG 47 Hong Kong, China 
GRC 12 Greece MYS 48 Malaysia 
HUN 13 Hungary MLT 49 Malta 
ISL 14 Iceland MAR 50 Morocco 
IRL 15 Ireland PHL 51 Philippines 
ISR 16 Israel7 ROU 52 Romania 
ITA 17 Italy RUS 53 Russian Federation 
JPN 18 Japan SAU 54 Saudi Arabia 
KOR 19 Korea SGP 55 Singapore 
LVA 20 Latvia ZAF 56 South Africa 
LTU 21 Lithuania TWN 57 Chinese Taipei 
LUX 22 Luxembourg THA 58 Thailand 
MEX 23 Mexico VNM 59 Viet Nam 
NLD 24 Netherlands ROW 60 Rest of the World 
NZL 25 New Zealand   
NOR 26 Norway   
POL 27 Poland   
PRT 28 Portugal   
SVK 29 Slovak Republic   
SVN 30 Slovenia   
ESP 31 Spain   
SWE 32  Sweden   
CHE 33 Switzerland   
TUR 34 Turkey   
GBR 35 United Kingdom   
USA 36 United States   
Source: ReadMe_analytical AMNE.xlsx from the OECD (https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/amne.htm) 
 
                                                        
6 Footnote on Turkey: The information in this document about “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the island. 
There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey recognizes 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context 
of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position in the “Cyprus issue.” Footnote on all the European Union 
Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognized by all members of the 
United Nations, except Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of 
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. 
7 The statistical data on Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities or 
third party. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East 
Jerusalem, and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. 
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Appendix 4. Industry (sector) code of the OECD AMNE ICIO data 
   
Code 1 Code 2 Industry 
A 1 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
B 2 Mining and extraction of energy-producing products 
C10T12 3 Food products, beverages, and tobacco 
C13T15 4 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather, and related products 
C16 5 Wood and products of wood and cork 
C17T18 6 Paper products and printing 
C19 7 Coke and refined petroleum products 
C20T21 8 Chemicals and pharmaceutical products 
C22 9 Rubber and plastic products 
C23 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 
C24 11 Basic metals 
C25 12 Fabricated metal products 
C26 13 Computer, electronic, and optical products 
C27 14 Electrical equipment 
C28 15 Machinery and equipment, nec.  
C29 16 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 
C30 17 Other transport equipment 
C31T33 18 
Other manufacturing (repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment) 
DTE 19 
Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, waste, and 
remediation services 
F 20 Construction 
G 21 Wholesale and retail trade (repair of motor vehicles) 
H 22 Transportation and storage 
I 23 Accommodation and food services 
J58T60 24 Publishing, audiovisual, and broadcasting activities 
J61 25 Telecommunications 
J62T63 26 IT and other information services 
K 27 Financial and insurance activities 
L 28 Real estate activities 
MTN 29 Other business sector services 
O 30 
Public administration and defense (compulsory social 
security) 
P 31 Education 
Q 32 Human health and social work 
RTS 33 
Arts, entertainment, recreation, and other service 
activities 
T 34 Private households with employed persons 
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